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Abstract—Software-defined networking, and the emergence of
OpenFlow-capable switches, enables a wide range of new network
functionality. However, enhanced programmability inevitably
leads to more software faults (or bugs). We believe that tools for
testing OpenFlow programs are critical to the success of the new
technology. However, the way OpenFlow applications interact
with the data plane raises several challenges. First, the space of
possible inputs (e.g., packet headers and inter-packet timings) is
huge. Second, the centralized controller has a indirect view of
the traffic and experiences unavoidable delays in installing rules
in the switches. Third, external factors like user behavior (e.g.,
mobility) and higher-layer protocols (e.g., the TCP state machine)
affect the correctness of OpenFlow programs.
In this work-in-progress paper, we extend techniques for
symbolic execution to generate inputs that systematically explore
the space of system executions. First, we analyze controller ap-
plications to identify equivalence classes of packets that exercise
different parts of the code. Second, we propose several network
models with increasing precision, ranging from simple traffic
models to live testing on the target network. Initial experiences
with our prototype, which symbolically executes OpenFlow ap-
plications written in Python, suggest that our techniques can help
programmers identify bugs in their OpenFlow programs.
I. INTRODUCTION
After more than a decade of arguing for programmable
networks, this vision is finally materializing. In particular, the
OpenFlow protocol allows a logically-centralized controller to
programmatically install packet-handling rules in the under-
lying switches [1]. Controller applications can dynamically
install new rules, read traffic statistics for existing rules, learn
about switch and link failures, and handle data packets on
behalf of the switches. Several commercial switch vendors
support OpenFlow, a number of campus and backbone de-
ployments are underway, and a growing collection of con-
troller applications implement new network functionality [2]–
[7]. However, along with easier extensibility, programmable
networks increase the potential for software faults (or bugs).
Conventional networks are largely driven by configurations
that can be statically checked. Even though today’s routers
and switches run complex software, the code is written, tested,
and debugged by the equipment vendors, and the functionality
is (somewhat) constrained by the protocol standardization
process. Still, even carefully-debugged, closed-source router
software can have bugs that trigger Internet-wide failures [8]–
[10]. In contrast, OpenFlow networks are driven by dynamic
programs, written by network operators and third-party de-
velopers. As more people start programming the network, the
problems with buggy software will only get worse.
Our goal is to help these programmers produce reliable new
OpenFlow applications. Designing domain-specific program-
ming languages is one approach to prevent common coding
mistakes. However, the adoption of new languages is difficult
in practice. Not surprisingly, existing OpenFlow applications
are written in well-known, general-purpose languages, like
Python and C++. Rather than design a new language, we are
creating tools and techniques for testing OpenFlow applica-
tions as extensively as possible, to detect and eliminate bugs.
In particular, we identify ways to explore the large space of
possible system executions, using carefully crafted inputs.
Two techniques from the verification community—model
checking [11], [12] and symbolic execution [13]—have proven
quite effective in detecting bugs in distributed systems soft-
ware. However, we cannot simply apply these techniques “out
of the box,” because programming OpenFlow networks raises
several additional challenges, such as:
Much larger space of inputs: An OpenFlow application is
data-plane driven, i.e., the program must react to a very large
space of possible packet headers and inter-packet timings.
Thus, the problem at hand is much harder than that of testing
control-plane software (e.g., BGP implementations).
Distributed collection of switches: While OpenFlow pro-
grams run on a centralized controller, the system is still dis-
tributed. The packets seen at the controller can be a subset or
superset of those expected by the programmer. The abstraction
of a central control plane hides the network latencies and can
give rise to race conditions, where rules are installed while
packets in flight are processed based on previous settings.
End-host devices, protocols, and applications: The traffic
and events seen in an OpenFlow network depends on outside
factors, such as user behavior (e.g., device mobility), transport
protocols (e.g., the TCP state machine), and end-host applica-
tions (e.g., Web servers). Hence, testing cannot focus on the
network topology and controller application in isolation.
To make testing tractable, we identify: (i) distinct packet
header patterns and (ii) packet timings, orderings, and other
network events that can exercise different paths through the
code. To accomplish the first goal, we perform dynamic analy-
sis of the OpenFlow application code to determine equivalence
classes of packets that exercise different parts of the code.
For the second task, we automatically infer and use network
models of increasing coverage and precision to inject the
relevant streams of packets into the application code. Each
execution of the application is checked for correctness by
verifying the universally applicable invariants (e.g., avoiding
black holes and loops), as well as those added by developers.
The main novelty of our work lies in automatically deter-
mining the complex network model that drives application
behavior. Existing model checking and symbolic-execution
tools for distributed systems require this model to be manually
specified. Moreover, we go one step further by checking the
2network itself, in contrast to existing approaches that take basic
network connectivity for granted.
In the remainder of this paper, we present a brief overview
of OpenFlow in Section II and a set of motivating OpenFlow
examples of software bugs in Section III. We then describe
the challenges of testing OpenFlow programs and we address
these challenges in Section IV. Section V presents our initial
implementation of a symbolic-execution engine capable of
running applications written in Python for the popular NOX
OpenFlow controller [14]. Section VI discusses related work,
and Section VII concludes the paper with a discussion of future
research directions.
II. OPENFLOW BACKGROUND
The OpenFlow protocol allows programs running on a
logically-centralized controller to coordinate a distributed col-
lection of switches.
OpenFlow switches: An OpenFlow switch has a flow table
that stores an ordered list of rules for processing packets. Each
rule consists of a pattern (matching on packet header fields),
actions (such as forwarding, dropping, flooding, or modifying
the packets, or sending them to the controller), a priority (to
distinguish between rules with overlapping patterns), and a
timeout (indicating whether/when the rule expires). A pattern
can require an “exact match” on all relevant header fields (i.e.,
a microflow rule), or have “don’t care” bits in some fields
(i.e., a wildcard rule). For each rule, the switch maintains
traffic counters that measure the number of bytes and packets
processed so far. When a packet arrives, a switch selects the
highest-priority matching rule, updates the traffic counters,
and performs the specified action(s). Switches also generate
events, such as a “join” event upon joining the network, or
“port change” events when links go up or down.
Centralized controller: An OpenFlow network has a cen-
tralized programming model, where one (or a few) software
controllers manages the underlying switches. The controller
(un)installs rules in the switches, reads traffic statistics col-
lected by the switches, and responds to network events. A
controller application defines a handler for each event (e.g.,
packet arrival, rule timeout, and switch join), which may
install new rules or issue new requests for traffic statistics.
A common idiom for controller applications is to respond to
a packet arrival by installing a rule for handling subsequent
packets directly in the data plane. Sending packets to the
controller introduces overhead and delay, so most applications
try to minimize the fraction of traffic that must go to the
controller. Most OpenFlow applications are written on the
NOX controller platform [14], which offers OpenFlow API
for applications written in Python or C++. These controller
applications are general-purpose programs that can perform
arbitrary computation and maintain arbitrary state.
III. EXAMPLE BUGS IN CONTROLLER PROGRAMS
Testing and debugging controller programs is challenging,
since small differences in packet header fields or packet timing
can affect the state of the network and “tickle” subtle bugs.
Multiple packets of a flow reaching the controller: A
common idiom in programming OpenFlow networks is to
direct a packet to the controller, and then install a rule for
the switches to handle the remaining packets of a flow in the
data plane. Yet, a race condition can easily arise if additional
packets arrive while the controller is in the middle of installing
the rule. These packets arrive at the controller as well. A
program that implicitly expects to see just one packet may
behave incorrectly when multiple packets arrive. For example,
imagine a program that intends to directs all packets in a flow
to the same randomly-selected server. The arrival of a second
packet may trigger the application to install a second rule that
directs packets to a different server replica. The program would
behave correctly in the common case where the subsequent
packets enter the network only after the rule is installed, but
break if a burst of packets arrives at the controller.
No atomic update across multiple switches: Many ap-
plications need to install rules at multiple switches (e.g., to
direct the packets over a particular path through the network).
These rules are not installed atomically, so some switches may
start applying new rules before other switches have installed
their rules. This can lead to unexpected behavior, where an
intermediate switch may encounter a packet that must go to
the controller for handling. Implicitly assuming that rules are
installed atomically can lead to subtle bugs that only manifest
themselves under certain packet timings and rule-installation
delays. Installing rules from “back to front” (from the end of
the path to the beginning) can prevent this mistake, but the
programmer may not choose to install the rules this way.
Previously-installed rules limit the controller’s visibility:
The controller program is really just one part of a distributed
system that includes the processing performed by the under-
lying switches. Installing a rule (e.g., that forwards or drops
all matching packets) not only dictates what processing a
switch performs, but also what packets the controller sees in
the future! For example, imagine a program implementing a
learning switch. Installing a wildcard rule to forward traffic
based only on the destination MAC address would keep the
controller from seeing some packets sent by new source
MAC addresses—preventing the network from “learning” how
to reach these addresses. While still successfully delivering
traffic, this program would lead to inefficient delivery (e.g.,
via unnecessary flooding) in some corner cases.
Composing functions that affect the same packets:
Networks often perform multiple tasks that affect the han-
dling of the same packets. For example, routing determines
which path carries each packet (e.g., based on destination IP
address), and monitoring determines which packets should be
grouped together for accumulating statistics (e.g., based on
TCP port number). Combining functionality is complicated,
potentially involving the “cross product” of the rules needed
for each function independently. OpenFlow switches rely on
rule priority to disambiguate between overlapping groups of
packets (e.g., to ensure a rule with destination address 1.2.3.4
and port 80 gets precedence over another rule that matches
all traffic to destination 1.2.3.4). Subtle mistakes in setting the
priorities can lead to a program that operates correctly except
for certain packets, or packets arriving in a particular order.
3Interaction with end-host software: Some controller ap-
plications rely on implicit assumptions about the software
running on the end host (e.g., new TCP connections start with a
SYN packet, or a Web download idle for more than 60 seconds
has completed). These applications may have subtle bugs
that only arise when hosts generate traffic that violates these
assumptions. For example, imagine a server load-balancing
application that directs client traffic to different Web server
replicas (e.g., sending traffic from source IP addresses starting
with 0 to one replica and starting with 1 to another) [5].
Any changes to the load-balancing policy should ensure any
ongoing TCP connection completes on the same server. By
installing a rule that temporarily directs traffic to the controller,
the application could inspect the next packet of each flow to
install a microflow rule directing new flows (i.e., if the packet
is a SYN) to a new server and ongoing flows (i.e., if the next
packet is not a SYN) to the old server. However, the TCP state
machine allows a host to retransmit SYN packets, raising the
possibility of duplicate SYN packets which could lead the
application to wrongly classify an ongoing connection as new.
IV. TESTING OPENFLOW PROGRAMS
The lesson we draw from the example bugs is that controller
programs may cause the network to misbehave when exposed
to corner cases unforeseen by the programmer. Intuitively,
testing the correctness of OpenFlow programs needs to account
for all possible corner cases. As these are clearly not known a
priori, we then want to focus our effort on subjecting the ap-
plication to a variety of carefully chosen inputs (i.e., sequences
of packets and network events). To choose relevant inputs, we
want to identify: (1) what values of packet header fields and
(2) what packet timings, orderings, and other network events
cause the execution of a certain path through the controller
program’s code. Fig. 1 illustrates how we want to proceed:
For (1), we note that the code itself, in its branching
predicates, can reveal the relationships between packet header
fields and code paths (e.g., an if statement checking for a
broadcast MAC address signals different behaviors depending
on whether the check succeeds). Therefore, we use code
analysis to determine “equivalence classes” of packets.
For (2), we must first look at what constitutes system
state. An OpenFlow network should be seen as a distributed
program composed of a controller program and several “switch
programs”. A switch program essentially implements a large
switch-case structure that performs different operations de-
pending on which rule matches the incoming packet. To reason
about the correctness of an OpenFlow program, we need to
observe the state of the entire network. Therefore, we specify
several models of network behavior that cover, with increasing
precision, the possible network events. With these models, we
can strike trade-offs between testing time/effort and fidelity.
Then, the process of testing OpenFlow applications starts
from combining (1) and (2) into a single model that succinctly
describes the space of many possible system executions. In
other words, this model describes what events are possible at
any given state. We use this model to decide what events to
inject into the application, similar to applying model checking
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Fig. 1. Identifying (1) relevant packet header fields and (2) packet sequences
and network events for testing OpenFlow applications.
based on explicit state enumeration. We extensively explore the
space of possible states and test each state against a collection
of universal and application-specific invariants.
A. Huge Space of Inputs: Equivalence Classes of Packets
The space of possible inputs that could be fed to the
application under test is huge. Each individual input is a packet
header from the data plane (e.g., a connection establishment
packet). Consider that there exists 232 different IPv4 addresses,
and 216 different ports, and each packet header has a source
and destination (address, port) pair. Further, it takes more than
one packet to uncover even the faults in our simple examples.
To deal with large input sizes, we use code analysis of
the OpenFlow application to determine equivalence classes of
packets. That is, we identify what (ranges of) values of header
fields determine the path through the application code. Within
each equivalence class, we pick a representative packet to feed
the application to exercise a particular code path.
We analyze the code using symbolic execution, which auto-
matically determines what input values can exercise each path
through the code. To do so, a symbolic execution engine runs
the program with symbolic inputs. The engine tracks the use
of the symbolic inputs and records the constraints involving
the possible input values. When the execution encounters a
branching point, the engine queries a satisfiability solver to
determine which paths are feasible, and logically forks the
execution to follow all feasible paths.
OpenFlow programs are typically structured as event-driven
code where each event is associated with an handler. For
example, Fig. 2 shows the pseudocode for a simple MAC-
learning switch application: it defines a packet handler named
packet_in (line 1). Briefly, this code maintains a per-switch
address table (line 2) that maps a host’s MAC address to its
associated switch port. If the source (line 3) and/or destination
address (line 10) is a broadcast address, it simply floods the
network (line 17). Otherwise, it first checks if the source is
unknown (line 4), in which case it updates the address table
(line 5). When the source is already known, it ensures the
packet came in from the expected port (lines 7-8) or it updates
the registered port (line 9). Then, if the destination is known
41 def packet_in(switch_id, inport, pkt):
2 mactable = app_state[switch_id]
3 if not is_broadcast(pkt.src):
4 if not mactable.has_key(pkt.src):
5 mactable[pkt.src] = (inport, time(), pkt)
6 else:
7 e = mactable[pkt.src]
8 if e[0] != inport:
9 mactable[pkt.src] = (inport, time(), pkt)
10 if not is_broadcast(pkt.dst) and ←֓
mactable.has_key(pkt.dst):
11 outport = mactable[pkt.dst][0]
12 if outport != inport:
13 rule = extract_rule(pkt, inport)
14 rule.actions.output = outport
15 install_rule(switch_id, rule)
16 return
17 flood_packet(switch_id, pkt)
Fig. 2. Pseudocode of a simple MAC-learning switch application, loosely
based on the pyswitch NOX application.
and it is not a broadcast address (line 10), it makes a final check
to verify that the destination and source ports are different
(line 12). If this sanity check succeeds, it installs a new rule in
the switch to forward the packet to the destination port (lines
13-15). Instead, when input and output ports are the same, it
simply floods the network (line 17).
To learn classes of packets, we apply symbolic execution to
packet_in event handlers. We expect symbolic execution
to be effective in covering all code paths in these handlers
because, to quickly react to many such events, handlers do
not generally perform complex, compute-intensive operations.
This alleviates the problem that symbolic execution usually
faces: an exponential number of paths in the program size.
However, plugging a packet handler into a symbolic execu-
tion engine is not sufficient for deriving the equivalence classes
of packets. In practice, the application state also plays a role
in determining what code is executed. For example, it is easy
to note that a symbolic execution engine would not be able to
find input values for packet_in that execute the branch at
lines 6-9. This is because, starting from the initial state (i.e., an
empty address table), the branch predicate at line 4 is always
false. Therefore, we note that certain application behaviors
are the result of sequences of packets. Our use of network
models of varying precision explained below is a first step in
addressing this issue. Secondarily, we want to infer from the
code the relationship between consecutive packets. The idea
is to track changes to the application state and relate them
to code paths that depend on state variables having certain
values. With reference to the previous example, we can easily
see that the statement at line 5 changes the application state
and that a consecutive call of packet_in with the same
source address would finally execute the branch at lines 6-9.
We want to automatically identify these state transitions and
use them to determine the initial state needed for expanding
the coverage of symbolic execution.
B. Complex Network Behavior: Progressively Detailed Net-
work Models
Testing typically requires a model of system behavior. While
effective in capturing the behavior expressed by the underlying
code, symbolic execution must be complemented by a model
of the environment. In our case, this model typically includes
a series of possible network-related events such as packet
drops, broken TCP connections, packet reorderings, node or
component failures, etc. [11], [15].
One could argue that this network model, which describes
interactions of packets and events within the network, is
common knowledge. However, we face the challenge that
we are dealing with a distributed system that controls basic
network connectivity—in contrast to previous work on check-
ing distributed systems, which takes network connectivity for
granted. Therefore, it is difficult to know beforehand how to
specify a model that covers relevant sets of packet reorderings,
inter-packet timings, and other network events.
Further, it is not possible to completely specify such a
model because the network behavior is in part determined by
the OpenFlow application, as we discussed earlier. Even if it
were possible to automatically infer the network model, there
exist a form of circular dependency in that the behavior of
the OpenFlow application depends on the network that it is
trying to control. For example, if the underlying network does
not form a spanning tree, a simple OpenFlow application that
floods packets can result in infinite packet loops.
Finally, we want to be able to detect problems due to inter-
operability issues that may arise when the controller program
uses specific implementations of OpenFlow. Therefore, we
cannot simply focus on checking the correctness of a controller
program in isolation from the switches.
We take a four-prong approach for building progressively
more detailed network models:
1) We start with a simple model based on the commonly
available knowledge. This model accounts for events
such as reordered packets, dropped packets, switch fail-
ures, link failures, topology changes, and user mobility.
2) We want to automatically augment the network model by
examining the OpenFlow application code. To illustrate,
consider the case of the TCP state machine. If we can
automatically process the state machine specification, we
automatically realize the need to subject the application
to repeated SYN packets and other corner cases.
3) We want to re-create the target network topology in
our testing environment by using virtual instances of
actual OpenFlow switch implementations (e.g., Open
vSwitch [16]). That is, rather than modeling switch
behavior at a high level, we wish to base our model
on the code that runs an OpenFlow switch.
4) To account for the unpredictability of the target network
and its behavior, we want to integrate our approach
with the network itself to enable testing the OpenFlow
application on the target network, but in isolation from
production traffic (similar to [13]).
These approaches are illustrated in Fig. 3 as concentric
circles where the captured network behavior monotonically
increases from approach one to four. This benefit of higher
precision, however, comes at the increase in complexity.
For example, the first approach already enables developers
to test their code under different packet-arrival patterns just
by using their workstation. The second approach introduces
relevant sequences of packets based on the analysis of the
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Fig. 3. Overview of our approach to building a network model that covers
progressively more network behaviors.
OpenFlow program code. The third step allows the behavior of
the system comprising the controller program and the network
of OpenFlow switches to be checked (still in a local setting).
Finally, the fourth step allows the programmer to gain more
confidence that the target network performs as expected by
testing on the network itself.
For testing, we use the network model to decide what events
can happen at any given state and to subject the OpenFlow
network to these events in a systematic way. Effectively, we
inject the application with a number of relevant inputs that
explore a variety of expected behaviors, as well as difficult-
to-produce corner cases.
C. Specifying Correctness is Hard: Testing Invariants
We have discussed how different application behavior can
be triggered by carefully crafted and timed inputs. However,
the question remains of knowing what constitutes a fault.
We will uncover software faults by detecting violations of
desired behavior, e.g., incorrect behavior. We are not interested
in finding straightforward memory safety violations, memory
leaks, etc., as we believe that the existing tools are sufficient
for this task.
Specifying correct behavior is a challenging problem even
for single machine applications. Simply put, most software is
written without considering the safety and liveness properties
typically used to describe desired behavior. In our case, the
addition of the distributed collection of switches presents
additional challenges, as it further complicates reasoning about
correctness.
Our approach to dealing with correctness is to: (i) incor-
porate properties that are widely applicable to all networking
applications (e.g., the forwarding rules should not induce loops
or black holes), and (ii) provide an API that the developer can
use to specify additional safety invariants or liveness properties
(e.g., all packets of the same microflow go to the same Web
server). As we inject inputs to the system, we test these
invariants after each system transition.
However, programmers often have difficulty stating mean-
ingful invariants for their code. OpenFlow programming raises
an alternative way to define correctness: the programmer
could write a simpler controller application where all packets
are handled by the controller, with no rules installed in the
underlying switches. These programs, while clearly inefficient,
are much easier to write because they side-step the challenges
of distributed state and race conditions that arise in delegating
work to the switches. In fact, writing the simple centralized
program is a natural first step toward writing a more complex
version that offloads packet-handling work to the switches.
By injecting the same inputs to both programs, we can check
whether the two programs treat all traffic the same way.
V. PRELIMINARY PROTOTYPE
We developed a symbolic execution engine capable of
running NOX applications implemented in Python. Within
it, the application is executed in a controlled environment
that provides a subset of the NOX API and is fed with
symbolic packets. The application execution is then traced
through the Python interpreter and this process is re-iterated
until all constraints have been recorded and negated, by using
a constraint solver, to explore all possible execution paths.
Python specifics. A key step in symbolic execution is
tracking the constraints during code execution. A notable
difference from symbolic execution of C code [13] is that
we had the option of changing the data types to be sym-
bolic, instead of having to instrument C code. For exam-
ple, we implemented a “symbolic integer” type to be able
to follow a symbolic variable through the program execu-
tion. This way the engine knows immediately whenever a
change/assignment/comparison to a symbolic variable is made.
We also implemented arrays of these symbolic integers.
OpenFlow specifics. The basic unit of symbolic input is a
packet, and the engine feeds a symbolic packet at a time to
the application and records all constraints that are applied
to it. Our symbolic integer is the base for a real packet
symbolic type that is substituted to the packet type provided by
NOX. For example, we currently mark two MAC addresses as
symbolic six-byte arrays, as well as a symbolic type to inject
the symbolic packet into the pyswitch MAC-learning switch
application.
VI. RELATED WORK
The CMC [17] model checker was successfully used to
check network protocol implementations (e.g., the Linux im-
plementation of TCP/IP and the AODV ad-hoc routing pro-
tocol). The MaceMC distributed systems model checker [11]
can detect liveness property violations in distributed systems
code, while CrystalBall [12] can guard against safety property
violations due to unknown bugs. All of these require manual
creation of the network model used to trigger state changes.
Symbolic execution has proven useful in automatically
creating test cases that attempt to exhaustively exercise all
code paths in a given piece of code [18]. Recently, Canini
et al. [13] have shown that it is possible to use symbolic
execution in the live setting to detect BGP misconfiguration.
However, both Klee [18] and DiCE [13] use small inputs to
overcome the path explosion problem that arises when large
inputs (as those needed for testing of OpenFlow applications)
are used. Moreover, symbolic execution requires manual effort
6to create branches in the code that the path exploration
engine can subsequently negate and trigger desired changes
in the network. For example, this is the approach taken in
KleeNet [15].
FlowChecker [19] can detect misconfiguration in one or
more OpenFlow forwarding tables. The main motivation for
this work arises in federated environments, potentially with
different OpenFlow controllers. FlowChecker builds upon the
existing ConfigChecker [20] tool, which requires manual con-
struction of a network model using binary decision diagrams.
This model is then checked using symbolic model checking
techniques for reachability and security. We view this work
as orthogonal to ours since it aims to check the OpenFlow
application behavior at runtime.
Frenetic [21] is a domain-specific language for OpenFlow
networks that introduces an abstraction that the OpenFlow
program examines every packet. By doing so, Frenetic aims
to eradicate a large class of programming faults that arise due
to a programmer’s confusion in handling individual packets
vs. installing wildcard rules on the switches (i.e., reactive
vs. proactive OpenFlow programming model). Using Frenetic
requires the network programmer to learn another language.
That said, the research on Frenetic inspired several of our ex-
ample bugs in Section III, and the idea of defining correctness
through a simple controller program that “sees every packet.”
OFRewind [22] is a system that enables recording and
replay of network events with the aim of facilitating trou-
bleshooting problems in production networks due to closed-
source components such as commercial routers and switches.
While OFRewind could be used to investigate misconfigura-
tion in OpenFlow networks, it does not automate the testing
of OpenFlow controller programs.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we argued for automating the testing of Open-
Flow applications. As the network programmability enhances,
risks arise that even a single bug in the centralized controller
can disrupt the entire network. Through a series of examples,
we showed several pitfalls where small differences in packet
headers or timing can result in unanticipated corner cases.
We identified the huge space of inputs, the complexity of
the distributed system, and the dependency of correctness on
external events as some of the challenges in testing OpenFlow
programs. Our goal is to automate the testing by subjecting
the application to a variety of carefully chosen sequences
of packets and network events. To do so, we propose to
dynamically analyze controller programs to identify equiva-
lence classes of packet headers and to use several network
models with increasing coverage and precision, ranging from
simple traffic models to live testing on the target network.
Initial experiences with our prototype, which symbolically
executes NOX applications written in Python, suggest that
our techniques can help programmers identify bugs in their
OpenFlow programs.
Our work is on-going. We plan to complete the imple-
mentation of the symbolic execution engine for Python to
include support for more data types and to automatically
detect relevant initial states. Further, we will build the network
models, analyze their coverage, and find techniques grounded
on formal methods that can help to cope with the large space
of system executions.
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